On May 27, 100+ OKC residents and three council members showed up to demand action. The contract renewal vote is in July. OKCPD confirmed in writing: no access controls, no audit procedures, no use policies. The contract says 90 cameras. The community map shows 299. Flock has been caught lying to other city councils, charged officers have been caught stalking partners, and federal lawsuits argue the system is unconstitutional. Nobody here can answer who is searching the data, where it's going, or what it's worth - and nobody is required to.
It's not just license plate readers anymore. It's a surveillance platform now under federal constitutional challenge, run by a vendor with a documented pattern of lying to city councils. Six concrete reasons it should concern every OKC resident.
OKCPD confirmed in writing: no access controls, no use policies, no audit procedures, no discipline standards, and no transparency reporting. Their only published ALPR policy (Manual §5-118) covers vehicle-mounted readers - not Flock's static cameras. Even Flock's own CEO says every city should have published use policies and regular audits. OKC has neither.
Oklahoma statute 47 O.S. §7-606.1 limits ALPR use to insurance enforcement. OKCPD uses Flock far beyond that. Their own Operations Manual states ALPR data "will not be shared as part of a law enforcement information database" - but Flock's entire business model is exactly that: 5,000+ agencies and 40,000+ cameras sharing data nationwide.
Every photo from every camera leaves city limits and lands on Flock's private servers, beyond the reach of any public records request. The devices have numerous confirmed security vulnerabilities and can be compromised in 30 seconds. Independent researchers found 67 cameras streaming live to the open internet - including one pointed at a children's playground. No password. No encryption. Anyone with a search engine could watch.
Flock's newer Condor cameras use AI-powered pan, tilt, and zoom to automatically follow people - not vehicles. The contract says 90 city cameras, but the community map shows 299 in the OKC metro. Private businesses, parking lots, and HOAs feed data into the same Flock network. In Dunwoody, GA, Flock employees were caught accessing cameras inside a gym, including the pool, fitness studio, and preschool daycare areas.
Officers have been charged with crimes for using Flock to stalk partners and exes. Tulsa PD logged protest-related searches. Texas deputies used it for an abortion investigation. Flock's own VP of Business Development searched a city's database 63 times without being a police officer. In San Francisco, outside agencies searched local data 1.6 million times without authorization. And when researchers reported all of this, Flock's CEO sent an email to police departments calling them "activists who want to defund the police."
Flock can activate new surveillance features - audio detection, video, AI capabilities - on existing cameras without council approval or public notice. In February 2026, they quietly rewrote their contract terms: deleting data ownership protections and adding a "perpetual, irrevocable, worldwide" data license that survives termination. They block web archiving so cities can't track changes.
No effectiveness report has ever been published for OKC's system. A peer-reviewed Berkeley analysis found ALPRs produce no statistically significant reduction in crime. In San Jose, only 0.25% of 360 million captured images matched any law enforcement hotlist. The rest was just data on ordinary people going about their lives.
OKC pays Flock $270,000 a year. Flock is valued at $8.4 billion. Camera leasing fees can't explain the gap - which means cities aren't the real customers. We are.
Who is actually paying for Flock? →“There is no transparency reporting or internal usage reporting in our policies, SOPs, directives, training or guidance materials.”- OKCPD Department Memorandum, March 10, 2026. Written on official letterhead in response to our records requests. Read it yourself.
We filed three requests to OKCPD and three to the City of Oklahoma City. Every finding below is sourced from official responses.
All three OKCPD requests came back with the same response: a link to the online Operations Manual. No Flock-specific documents, no contracts, no policies. The department that operates the system couldn't produce a single document governing its use.
Source: OCPD-2885, OCPD-2886, OCPD-2887-2026The City's response to our re-filed request included OKCPD's own internal memorandum - the document that confirms in writing: no access controls, no prohibited-use policies, no audit procedures, no discipline standards, and no transparency reporting.
Source: ORR-1095-2026, Department Memorandum OCPD-2885-2026Operations Manual §5-118 describes vehicle-mounted ALPR units operated by officers during shifts. It says nothing about Flock's static, network-connected cameras. It explicitly prohibits data sharing - the exact thing Flock's platform is built to do.
Source: OKCPD Operations Manual 6th Edition, pp. 283-284Flock's contract authorizes use for general "crime awareness, prevention, and prosecution." Oklahoma statute 47 O.S. §7-606.1 limits ALPR use to insurance enforcement. The gap between what's authorized and what's happening has never been publicly addressed.
Source: Master Agreement C241032 vs. 47 O.S. §7-606.1OKCPD admits training materials for Flock exist but withholds them as "law enforcement use only" - without citing any statutory exemption from the Oklahoma Open Records Act. If the training is above board, why can't the public see it?
Source: OCPD-2885-2026 Internal Memorandum, Item 2These are the OKC findings. For the full national picture - business model, security failures, federal lawsuits, vendor conduct, and the broader coalition pushing back - read The Case →
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